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FAMILY LAW AND 
THE NEW ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Rebecca Aviel* 
INTRODUCTION 
Civil litigation reform has so consistently and predictably benefitted a 
certain set of defendants, at the expense of a certain set of plaintiffs, that it 
has understandably come to be assumed antithetical to access-to-justice 
values.1  The view, however, looks different in family court, where reformers 
are implementing transformative changes that are consistent with access-to-
justice values:  these reforms are delivering dispute-resolution mechanisms 
that are faster, cheaper, and easier to maneuver, particularly for self-
represented litigants.2 
This Article explores whether the optimistic prospect suggested by this 
experience—of reform that promotes rather than inhibits access-to-justice 
values—is inherently limited to family law.  Does the experience with family 
court reform offer insights that transfer to other contexts, or is family law 
simply too exceptional?  On the one hand, family law disputes are unique in 
some truly important ways.  It is difficult, for example, to conceive of a 
convincing analogue for postdivorce parenting, and what we mean by 
“justice” can be fundamentally different for domestic-relations litigants than 
for others.  On the other hand, reform in family court has been driven in part 
by concerns about cost and speed that are hardly unique to domestic-relations 
litigants.  This Article suggests that some features of family court reform may 
transfer to other contexts.  Chief among these features is an emphasis on 
triage rather than standardization as the touchstone of a fair and effective 
specialized court. 
This Article first sets out the view from family court, describing the 
reforms that are taking root and arguing that they serve access-to-justice 
values.  It then assesses whether the core attributes of family law make the 
field too exceptional for these reforms to have any transferable application to 
 
*  Associate Professor, Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, University of Denver Sturm 
College of Law.  This Article was prepared for the Colloquium entitled Access to Justice and 
the Legal Profession in an Era of Contracting Civil Liability, hosted by the Fordham Law 
Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 27, 2017, at Fordham University 
School of Law. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare:  The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants 
from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1537 (2016) (describing a series of substantive 
and procedural developments that “have erected near-impossible obstacles in the path to the 
courthouse for economically disadvantaged groups”).  
 2. See infra Part I. 
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other contexts.  Having established that domestic-relations litigants and the 
institutions that serve them are concerned about reducing cost and increasing 
speed, this Article observes that these objectives no doubt transfer to other 
contexts, and so it is worth focusing on some of the essential qualities that 
family court reformers have used to balance efficiency and individualized 
justice. 
I.  THE VIEW FROM FAMILY COURT 
Family law has undergone a pronounced turn away from formal 
adversarial procedure that is well documented in the academic literature.3  
For policymakers, judges, administrators, and other professionals working in 
domestic relations, the consensus that adversarial resolution of family issues 
is best avoided can hardly be overstated,4 and the ongoing effort to focus on 
problem-solving models with a therapeutic orientation is robust.5  
Nonetheless, to assist with the overarching goal of assessing whether family 
court reform might provide insight for other contexts, it is useful to begin 
with a brief sketch of how far family law has come over the last fifty years to 
arrive at this juncture. 
To truly appreciate the current vantage point, it is essential to remember 
that until the so-called “no fault revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s, divorce 
was only available to an “innocent” spouse who could prove that his or her 
partner had committed a specific type of misconduct—such as adultery, 
cruelty, or abandonment—and was therefore at fault for breach of the marital 
contract.6  Divorce was inescapably adversarial:  spouses were not 
encouraged to work together to end their marriage in a collaborative way and 
 
 3. See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, Counsel for the Divorce, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1111 (2014) 
(“The traditional model of full-fledged, individualized partisan advocacy has all but become 
obsolete for family law cases—unaffordable for most couples and unattractive for many 
more.”); Barbara A. Babb, Reevaluating Where We Stand:  A Comprehensive Survey of 
America’s Family Justice Systems, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 230, 230 (2008) (“Court reform relative 
to family law matters has risen steadily over the past decade.  States have restructured their 
justice systems to handle increasingly complex family law cases and burgeoning family law 
caseloads.”). 
 4. See generally Aviel, supra note 3; Babb, supra note 3; Jane C. Murphy & Jana B. 
Singer, Moving Family Dispute Resolution from the Court System to the Community, 75 MD. 
L. REV. ENDNOTES 9 (2016).  As captured in one pithy summary, “Everyone who works in 
family law . . . agrees on two things:  family court is not good for families, and litigation is not 
good for children.” Michael Saini, Triage as an Innovative Framework for Domestic Relations 
Cases, Presentation at Modern Families, Innovative Courts:  The 2015 Domestic Relations 
Best Practice Court Institute for Judges, Magistrates, Family Court Facilitators and Sherlocks 
(June 1–3, 2015) (PowerPoint on file with author).   
 5. See, e.g., Murphy & Singer, supra note 4, at 9 (“Mediation, collaboration, and other 
non-adversarial processes have replaced a traditional, law-oriented adversarial regime.”).  
 6. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 142–45 (3d ed. 2005); id. at 
145 (“[Fault-based divorce was] an adversary proceeding.  An innocent and virtuous spouse 
sued an evil or neglectful partner.  The defendant had to be at fault; there had to be ‘grounds’ 
for the divorce.”).  
2018] THE NEW ACCESS TO JUSTICE 2281 
were in fact prohibited from doing so.7  As difficult as it may be to imagine 
now, such cooperation was treated as collusive and a fraud on the court.8 
A much-needed corrective arrived in the form of no-fault divorce, which 
allowed spouses to divorce upon a showing of “irreconcilable differences”9 
or the “irretrievable breakdown”10 of their marriage, but this reform was only 
a partial response.  For well after the advent of no-fault divorce, family court 
still operated on the premise that divorce would unfold in much the same way 
as other civil litigation:  each party would be represented by a capable lawyer, 
the parties would engage in discovery, motions would be filed and hearings 
would be held, and, after a trial in which evidence was proffered and legal 
arguments presented, a judge would issue an order dissolving the marriage 
and resolving the attendant financial and child-related issues.11  Even if the 
couple were in agreement that the marriage should end, and were permitted 
by the innovation of no-fault divorce to openly proceed in that joint endeavor, 
there were still multiple avenues to press for advantage, using all the 
procedures and techniques of adversarial litigation.12  Commentators have 
thus suggested that no-fault divorce did not eliminate the rancor or hostility 
from divorce proceedings but merely shifted it from the dissolution itself to 
the collateral issues of property distribution, spousal support, child support, 
and child custody.13 
Family court reformers, to their credit, have resisted the conclusion that 
such hostility is an unavoidable feature of any system that involves divorcing 
spouses.14  Rather than assuming that divorcing spouses bring with them to 
 
 7. Id. at 145. 
 8. See Fuchs v. Fuchs, 64 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488–89 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (noting that “a party 
cannot consent to the entry of a decree of divorce” because of the “well known vigilance of 
the courts to prevent collusion, and because of the general interest of the people of the state in 
the preservation of the matrimonial status of its citizens”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, 
at 145 (“The law insisted that divorce by mutual consent was wrongful and impossible.”).   
 9. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2400(a)(2) (West 2015). 
 10. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-110 (2016).  
 11. See Alan H. Frank et al., No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate:  The Nebraska 
Experience—an Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1, 49 
(1978) (suggesting that even after many states began to embrace the no-fault system, the 
practice of family law remained largely the same for several years).  One notable difference, 
however, with ramifications that extend well beyond professional ethics, is the prohibition on 
contingency-fee arrangements in domestic-relations cases. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 12. See Frank et al., supra note 11, at 49–51.  
 13. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 579–80; Frank et al., supra note 11, at 50–51. 
 14. See, e.g., LOGAN CORNETT ET AL., OUT OF COURT AND IN COLLABORATION:  
EVALUATING A NEW MODEL FOR SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN A UNIVERSITY SETTING 1 
(2016), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/rcsdf_out_of_court_and 
_in_collaboration.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y96T-VC34] (“Even when families intend to divorce 
with dignity, integrity, and support for their children, the structure of the court system is often 
at odds with that approach.  Court processes continue to emphasize traditional civil 
adjudication in family cases, which naturally places parents in the position of adversaries.”); 
NATALIE ANNE KNOWLTON, STEWARDS OF THE SYSTEM, LEADERS OF CHANGE 4–5 (2016), 
http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/the_family_law_bar_stewards_
of_the_system_leaders_of_change.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN6N-E4SP]; Andrew Schepard et 
al., The Family Law Bar, the Interdisciplinary Resource Center for Separating and Divorcing 
Parents, and the “Spark to Kindle the White Flame of Progress,” 55 FAM. CT. REV. 84, 89 
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family court some static, predetermined level of conflict to which the system 
passively responds, reformers have internalized the premise that the system 
itself can either heighten or reduce conflict, and family court processes 
should be designed with this in mind.15  While it might seem inevitable, for 
example, that divorcing spouses will be adverse to one another on what 
appear to be zero-sum financial matters, the transaction costs of proceeding 
in an adverse posture can quickly overtake whatever financial gains might 
result from litigating to the hilt.  A sophisticated system will help divorcing 
spouses see and avoid these costs, offering them the infrastructure to 
recognize the shared gains to be had from cooperation.16  And yet, for 
families struggling with substance abuse, violence, mental health concerns, 
and other chronic challenges, it may be inappropriate to expect or encourage 
cooperation.17  The ongoing challenge for family court reformers, then, has 
been to design systems and processes that do not exacerbate family conflict 
but do not ignore it, either, and instead offer individualized responses in the 
face of persistent resource constraints. 
In jurisdictions that have moved the furthest toward this goal, families 
coming to court for the resolution of domestic-relations matters encounter a 
multistream system that endeavors to tailor the level of procedural intricacy 
to the degree of conflict and complexity presented by their particular 
circumstances, a concept sometimes described as “differentiated case 
management.”18  Such systems encourage simplification where possible, rely 
heavily on the expertise of nonlegal professionals to provide both diagnostic 
and therapeutic services, and offer a dynamic rather than lockstep process.19  
These systems are managed by court officials and constantly respond to 
developments in the earlier stages of a given case.20  This Part explores some 
of the specific innovations that one might see in such jurisdictions and then 
considers whether they can be characterized as access-to-justice reforms. 
 
(2017) (“Many parents want and benefit from a model of legal service delivery that emphasizes 
problem solving and what unites—rather than divides—them. . . .  Rather than assuming the 
parties will be positioned as adversaries, . . . lawyers and the system should help the parties 
work together.”). 
 15. See generally CORNETT ET AL., supra note 14; KNOWLTON, supra note 14; Schepard et 
al., supra note 14. 
 16. See Saini, supra note 4. 
 17. Scholars and advocates have long debated whether mediation, for example, is 
appropriate in situations involving domestic violence. See generally Susan Landrum, The 
Ongoing Debate About Mediation in the Context of Domestic Violence:  A Call for Empirical 
Studies of Mediation Effectiveness, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 425 (2011) (describing a 
range of different views and gathering sources).  
 18. ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY:  INTERDISCIPLINARY 
MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 113 (2004). 
 19. Id. at 114. 
 20. Id. at 113–14. 
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A.  Innovations in Modern Divorce 
1.  Simplified Dissolution 
“Simplified,” “summary,” or “expedited” dissolution allows a couple who 
meets certain eligibility requirements to convert their agreement into a formal 
divorce decree with minimal time and process, sometimes without even 
appearing in court.21  The states that have incorporated such an option into 
their domestic-relations framework differ as to the particulars, but a few 
commonalities are apparent.22  The basic concept is to set forth a relatively 
concrete set of criteria that the couple must satisfy in addition to presenting 
the court with a full agreement as to all collateral issues.23  These criteria tend 
to consist of limits on, for example, the length of time the couple has been 
married, the amount of property or debt the couple has jointly and 
individually owned or incurred, and whether the couple has children.24  These 
criteria, although straightforward enough for many couples to apply to their 
own circumstances without a lawyer, simultaneously reflect some of family 
law’s most enduring and foundational principles:  the idea that a couple’s 
financial entanglements and mutual dependence grow over time, such that a 
longer marriage is more difficult to unwind;25 that courts have an 
independent obligation to vigorously scrutinize parental agreements, 
ensuring that the best interests of children are considered;26 and that property 
acquired during marriage, with certain exclusions, is marital and thus subject 
to equitable distribution upon divorce.27 
Simplified dissolution options thus reflect a nuanced balance between the 
couple’s interest in being the masters of their own separation agreement, as 
 
 21. See Hon. Lynda B. Munro (Ret.) et al., Administrative Divorce Trends and 
Implications, 50 FAM. L.Q. 427, 428 (2016) (describing summary dissolution as offering 
couples “a more efficient, less public, and more cost-effective dissolution of their marriage”).  
For an early overview of simplified dissolution, see Anne M. Eggers, Summary Dissolution 
and Uncontested Pro Se Representation:  Viable Alternatives in the Divorce Dilemma, 12 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 285, 285 (1991). 
 22. See generally Munro et al., supra note 21 (comparing the summary dissolution 
procedures of several different states).  The states that have adopted a form of summary 
dissolution include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, California, Connecticut, Oregon, Illinois, 
Indiana, Montana, Florida, New York, and Minnesota. Id. at 433–34. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at 435–40. 
 25. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (alternatives 
A and B) (instructing courts to consider the duration of the marriage in making property 
determinations).   
 26. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(7) (2016) (instructing that proposed parenting 
plans must be submitted to the court for approval).  
 27. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002).  While some of the American Law 
Institute’s principles are more reformist in nature rather than a reflection of the existing state 
of the law, section 4.03’s definition of “marital property” does reflect the approach taken in 
most jurisdictions. JUDITH AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1025 (6th ed. 
2012).  While couples can, of course, agree to unwind their finances in ways that diverge from 
the “fruit of marital labor” principle, we might think that where the assets are substantial, it is 
important that rights be waived in a fully informed and deliberative posture that is not available 
without a hearing.  
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quickly and cheaply as possible, and the state’s interest in ensuring that the 
agreement has received an appropriate level of review, roughly calibrated to 
the interests at stake.  As with any such effort to balance competing goals, it 
is not perfect.28  But neither is it mandatory, and both parties have to agree 
to participate in order to proceed.29  For those who value speed, the upside is 
clear:  a decree in a fraction of the time, and at a fraction of the cost, that it 
would take to proceed through the standard sequence.  In Minnesota, for 
example, a simplified dissolution takes thirty days as compared to the twelve-
month period that characterizes the vast majority of nonsimplified cases.30 
Simplified dissolution, however, is about more than just speed, lowering 
costs, or reducing the inconvenience of appearing in court.  For those couples 
who qualify, it is a chance to choose a minimalist role for the state in the 
dissolution of their marriage.31  As captured by one judge discussing the 
importance of offering a simplified dissolution procedure, when it comes to 
couples who want and are eligible for it, “we need to get out of their way.”32  
The opportunity to weaken the state’s monopoly over divorce should be 
recognized as an access-to-justice value.33 
 
 28. As one group of commentators observes,  
With no judicial review, one or both of the parties may end up with a result that is 
unfair or inequitable and with no remedy.  Rather, the parties will be left to their 
own devices and may find themselves with an agreement that sounded fair at the 
time that they signed, but in reality leaves one party with significantly more assets 
than the other . . . . 
Moreover, without the discovery process, where the parties have the right to 
obtain each other’s financial documents—including tax returns, bank statements, 
credit card statements, pay stubs, insurance policies, appraisals of any assets, and 
the like—there is no way to ensure that each party has an accurate and complete 
understanding of all of the assets and liabilities in their marital estate.  
Munro et al., supra note 21, at 442.  Note that some of these difficulties are resolvable—
Illinois, for example, requires that couples seeking expedited divorce “have disclosed to each 
other all assets and liabilities and their tax returns for all years of the marriage.” 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/452(i) (2016). 
 29. Munro et al., supra note 21, at 433. 
 30. MINN. STAT. § 518.195(2) (2017) (“The district court administrator shall enter a decree 
of dissolution 30 days after the filing of the joint declaration if the parties meet the statutory 
qualifications and have complied with the procedural requirements of this subdivision.”).  
Over 98 percent of dissolutions, with or without children involved, were disposed of within 
twenty-four months. See COURT SERVS. DIV., MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES:  KEY RESULTS AND MEASURES 5 (2015), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/ 
media/CIOMediaLibrary/Documents/Annual-Report-2015-Perf-Measures.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EKN2-CUZ3].  Of that percentage, 94 percent were resolved in twelve 
months. Id. at 16. 
 31. This minimalism can be thought of as an antidote for the interventionism and 
excessive displays of state power that many litigants encounter in family court. See, e.g., 
Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 GEO. 
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 503 (2015) (“Lecturing and chiding litigants, typical of 
problem-solving court judges, infantilizes litigants and reinforces notions that low-income 
people appearing before the court are childish and in need of state supervision.”).  
 32. Judge Randall Arp, Chair, Colo. Supreme Court Standing Comm. on Family Issues, 
Remarks at Meeting of the Colorado Supreme Court Standing Committee on Family Issues 
(Apr. 21, 2017). 
 33. The Supreme Court’s discussion of the state monopoly over divorce nearly fifty years 
ago is still surprisingly apt:   
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2.  Mediation Improved:  Early Neutral Assessment 
Families whose circumstances make them ineligible for summary 
dissolution may nonetheless be able to resolve their dispute without trial if 
they have access to other alternatives, and mediation is one that has become 
well established in family court.34  It has a strong track record in reducing 
costs while increasing litigant satisfaction but has also been plagued by some 
recognized shortcomings.35  One of the improvements that has been 
particularly promising is “early neutral assessment” (ENA), also described as 
“early neutral evaluation” (ENE), in which a neutral third party with 
substantive experience in the field gives the parties “a confidential opinion 
regarding the likely outcome of the case and an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each side’s arguments.”36 
ENA is a voluntary, opt-in process that builds on two crucial insights about 
assisting families in dissolution.  First, that dissolution, like many other 
processes, is characterized by path dependence—that what happens in the 
early stages of a divorce dictates and limits subsequent developments.37  It 
therefore is not enough to offer (or even require) mediation in an effort to 
divert cases from trial; to optimize the chances for success, parties must enter 
mediation before they have dug in on their respective positions.  The second 
key insight underpinning ENA is that divorcing couples need more than just 
passive facilitation to arrive at a fair and effective agreement:  they need 
information and context to guide their negotiation.38  By offering the couple 
not only facilitation but also substantive assessment, ENA provides the 
 
[W]e are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may covenant for or 
dissolve marriages without state approval.  Even where all substantive requirements 
are concededly met, we know of no instance where two consenting adults may 
divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations 
that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, 
without invoking the State’s judicial machinery.  
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).  
 34. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation:  
Responding to the Challenges of Crafting Effective Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53, 53 (2005) 
(noting that mediation of family law cases has become well established in American courts).  
 35. Critiques of mediation include concerns that it is “rushed and mechanical.” Rebecca 
Love Kourlis et al., Courts and Communities Helping Families in Transition Arising from 
Separation or Divorce, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 351, 364 (2013). 
 36. Jordan Leigh Santeramo, Note, Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. 
CT. REV. 321, 321, 325 (2004).  The ENE program adopted in Hennepin County, Minnesota, 
was named by the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the Harvard 
Kennedy School of Government as one of the “Top 50 Government Innovations” in 2009. 
Early Case Management/Early Neutral Evaluation, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, 
http://www.mncourts.gov/Help-Topics/ENE-ECM.aspx [https://perma.cc/LZ7H-2M3R] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 37. See Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:  The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (“‘[P]ath dependence’ 
means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical 
path leading to it.  It entails, in other words, a causal relationship between stages in a temporal 
sequence, with each stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage.”). 
 38. See Aviel, supra note 3, at 1113–16 (explaining that mediation involves the waiver of 
significant rights and that it is essential that parties are provided with sufficient guidance to 
make “reasonably informed decisions”).  
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objective criteria that negotiation theorists have long instructed is a crucial 
element of “getting to yes.”39 
As with simplified dissolution, the details of ENA programs can vary from 
one jurisdiction to the next.  In the Colorado jurisdictions that offer ENA, a 
team is comprised of one lawyer and one mental health professional, one of 
whom is male and one of whom is female.40  The lawyer is available to 
answer questions about the governing legal framework;41 the mental health 
professional offers insight about child development, attachment theory, and 
other concepts important for separating parents to understand.42  After 
hearing from the parties, the ENA team will then give an assessment of what, 
in their professional view, is in the interests of the child (or children) for 
whom parenting responsibilities are being determined and what is likely to 
occur if a judge were to rule on the case.43  The premise is that the ensuing 
negotiation will be more successful if each parent has been assisted in 
developing a realistic expectation and has had some expert guidance 
developing child-centered terms.44  With this foundation, parties can resolve 
their entire parenting-time dispute in a period of three to four hours, including 
the assessment, the negotiation, and the conversion of their agreement into a 
decree.45  As one judge explains, parties can walk into the courthouse for 
their ENA session, negotiate a fully comprehensive parenting-time 
agreement—complete with holidays, transportation issues, and the like—and 
walk out of the courthouse with a permanent order.46  It is essential to 
emphasize the significance of what might seem like a trivial detail—for 
working parents juggling an array of competing demands during a highly 
stressful period, access to justice means less rather than more time in court.47 
 
 39. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES:  NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING 
IN 82–93 (2011). 
 40. Early Neutral Assessment, COLO. JUD. DEP’T, https://www.courts.state.co.us/ 
userfiles/file/Court_Probation/08th_Judicial_District/Larimer/ENA%20Info%20Sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4RWH-PPCF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).  Minnesota also requires that 
ENA teams for parenting determinations be comprised of one male member and one female 
member but does not specify the professional training of the team other than to state that 
“[e]valuators must be seasoned professionals, able to screen for domestic violence, able to 
gather relevant information efficiently, and able to ascertain the merits and weaknesses of each 
party’s case quickly.” Minn. Judicial Council, Minn. Judicial Branch, Minnesota Early Case 
Management (ECM) and Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE) Best Practices for Family Court 9 
(July 1, 2012), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scao_library/ENE/ECM-
ENE_Statewide_Best_Practices_520-1_(final_5-17-12).pdf [https://perma.cc/5VQ6-
QXKM]. 
 41. See Early Neutral Assessment, supra note 40. 
 42. Id.  Notably, parties can choose ENA whether they are counseled or self-represented. 
Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Cojudicial, Early Neutral Assessment, YOUTUBE (Feb. 14, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4vQuj6IYzI [https://perma.cc/E5DG-4S5K]. 
 46. Id. (predicting that postdecree modification motions will be much reduced for ENA-
resolved cases). 
 47. See Richard Zorza, Some First Thoughts on Court Simplification:  The Key to Civil 
Access and Justice Transformation, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 845, 859 (2013) (noting that “[f]or poor 
and middle-income people, each hearing or step may represent lost wages, or even the threat 
of a lost job, as well as incidental travel and childcare expenses”); see also Rebecca Aviel, 
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3.  The Importance of Screening and Triage 
In evaluating whether these new programs promote or inhibit access-to 
justice values, it is important to understand that they are simply not suitable 
for all families, and they are not offered with the expectation that every 
family will participate.  In fact, the predicate is the opposite—that the 
programs only work when matched with families that can benefit from them 
and that one of the most important functions court staff can perform is the 
effective sorting necessary to achieve this match.48  Screening and triage thus 
compose the fulcrum upon which family court reform rests. 
Family court reformers have learned the importance of screening and 
triage from experience.  The current orientation toward triage represents an 
evolution from an approach to family court management that could be 
described as a tiered regime, in which all families move through a sequential 
phase of services and resolution efforts, supposedly on an increasing 
spectrum from the least to most intrusive, that escalates to the final stage of 
litigation where necessary.49  Although similarly motivated by the principle 
that adversarial litigation of family disputes, especially those involving 
children, is a last resort to be avoided wherever possible, the tiered approach 
is different from a triage approach in some important ways.50  The former is 
“one-size-fits-all” in the sense that each family moves on the same track, with 
the effect of shepherding higher-conflict families through interventions that 
are virtually certain to fail before providing more specialized services tailored 
to their level of conflict and complexity.51  Not only is this a waste of 
resources for the system, but, for the high-conflict families in this category, 
the lock-step approach slows down their progress toward a final disposition 
and may even pose risks to their safety.  One of the key principles of 
domestic-relations triage is that families should not undergo services that will 
not help them; that they should not participate in processes, however salutary 
 
Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106, 2109 (2013) (noting that in 
family court, “[m]ost litigants want proceedings that are shorter, simpler, cheaper, more 
personal, more collaborative, and less adversarial”).  
 48. See Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services:  The Beginning 
of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 383–84 (2009). 
 49. Id. at 372–76.  One visual metaphor for this is a staircase:  the lowest stair represents 
services that one might get before even filing an action, such as information available on a 
website explaining the dissolution process; the middle stairs reflect court intake and mediation; 
and the top of the staircase represents litigation. See Saini, supra note 4. 
 50. The National Center for State Courts describes the tiered approach as follows:   
Many courts process divorce cases linearly, each case moving through the same set 
of prescribed steps.  In this model, families are presented with a tiered set of services 
that specify how a case will move from initial contact with the court through 
progressively more intrusive and directive services and proceedings.  This approach 
burdens those where both sides are largely in agreement and just want to have the 
case resolved in timely fashion, while siphoning resources away from families that 
may truly benefit from enhanced services.  
The High Performance Court and Divorce Case Triage, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
http://www.ncsc.org/services-and-experts/areas-of-expertise/children-and-families/divorce-
case-triage.aspx [https://perma.cc/H58J-WVUY] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 51. See id. 
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in the abstract, that have no realistic prospect of resolving their dispute.52  
Correspondingly, under a triage approach, judicial involvement is not 
withheld until other services have failed; rather, families that require judicial 
intervention are understood to need it as soon as possible.53 
Against this backdrop, family court triage can be understood as an effort 
to sort litigants by the degree of conflict and complexity presented by their 
circumstances, with the goal of tailoring court processes accordingly and 
providing appropriate services as soon as possible.54  As the graphic55 below 
suggests, conflict and complexity are distinct concepts and occur 
independently: 
The conflict element is somewhat intuitive as a feature of divorce cases, 
which involve the dissolution of the most intimate of human relationships.  
Complexity, on the other hand, might stem from any number of variables in 
a domestic-relations case, such as marital assets that are difficult to value or 
partition, prospective relocation for one of the parents, or immigration 
consequences attendant to the custodial determination.56  The presence of 
either conflict or complexity is likely to drive up the degree of resources 
necessary to bring a case to resolution, and an effective triage system will 
have ways of identifying which cases present these features such that litigants 
can be matched with the appropriate services.57 
 
 52. Triage might, therefore, mean the end of mandatory mediation. See generally Salem, 
supra note 48. 
 53. See id. at 380–81. 
 54. Kara Martin, Colo. Domestic Relations Triage Project, Presentation at Meeting of the 
Colorado Supreme Court Standing Committee on Family Issues (Apr. 21, 2017) (PowerPoint 
on file with the author).  
 55. Id.  Alicia Davis of the Nation Center for State Courts granted permission to use this 
graphic. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Another expert offers a typology of five different groups of family court litigants, in 
increasing order of conflict, complexity, and therefore, need. Saini, supra note 4.  At one end 
of the spectrum are the “stampers,” who have reached an agreement but need the court to 
formalize and incorporate it into a decree. Id.  At the other end are the “intractables”—parties 
who are severely entrenched in dispute or who exhibit several risk factors for prolonged 
conflict, and therefore need specialized services to help them arrive at resolution. Id.  In the 
middle, we have the “contemplators,” the “nudgers,” and the “entrenchables,” representing 
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This tailoring is operationalized through intake procedures that seek to 
elicit from litigants the specific types of information that court staff will need 
to assess the level of complexity, conflict, and need.58  These screening 
instruments might attempt to discern whether the case presents domestic 
violence concerns, whether there are pending criminal cases or civil 
protection orders, whether one of the parties has drained assets from mutual 
accounts, or whether one spouse has otherwise prevented the other from 
accessing funds.59  They might also seek information about disability or 
immigration status.60  Screening tools vary by jurisdiction—Alaska’s 
screening instrument, for example, elicits information about potential tribal 
court jurisdiction that would not need to be front and center for family courts 
in other states.61  In some jurisdictions, triage is practiced informally, by 
individual court administrators bringing to bear their own experiences 
managing family court dockets.62  The practices are widely understood to be 
essential to the effective management of the system but are not 
institutionalized or systematized.63 
It should be understood that in all of their varied forms, the screening 
instruments are not simply ministerial, record-gathering exercises.  They are 
the product of decades of experience with domestic-relations litigants as well 
as input from mental health experts and advocates for domestic violence 
survivors, and they are constantly being discussed, evaluated, and refined.  
The efficacy of these tools is, of course, an ever-present concern.  
 
varying degrees of complexity and conflict, requiring different types of assistance from court 
staff to resolve their disputes. Id. 
 58. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., THE HIGH PERFORMANCE COURT AND DIVORCE CASE 
TRIAGE 6–10 (2014), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/ 
Areas%20of%20expertise/Children%20Families/The-HPC-and-Divorce-Case-Triage-Final-
Report-12312014.ashx [https://perma.cc/CS3H-PC5F] (describing how researchers surveyed 
existing screening instruments). 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 9; Colo. Domestic Relations Triage Project, Triage Tools Currently 
Used, Presentation at Colorado Domestic Relations Triage Project Workshop (Dec. 1, 2016) 
(on file with author) (compiling and reviewing existing screening tools used in Connecticut, 
Alaska, Nebraska, Colorado, Arizona, and Florida).   
 60. See, e.g., OSTROM ET AL., supra note 58, at 9. 
 61. See Kara Martin, Colo. Courts, Alicia Davis, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Exploration 
of a Systematized Triage Approach, Presentation at Colorado Domestic Relations Triage 
Project Workshop (Dec. 1, 2016) (on file with author).  In determining whether a case might 
be inappropriate for its early resolution program, Alaska’s screening instrument seeks to elicit 
particular information, such as whether there is a tribal court custody case pending; whether 
there is any dispute about jurisdiction (either as between state court jurisdictions or between 
state and tribal court); whether there are complicated financial determinations that must be 
made, such as the ownership of a business that must be partitioned; and whether there is a 
third-party request for custody from a grandparent or other relative or an assertion by a 
nonparent that he or she has been functioning as a parent and is the child’s psychological 
parent. Id.   
 62. Id. 
 63. State court administrators in Colorado gave a presentation providing an overview of 
domestic-relations triage practices throughout the state, highlighting some of the challenges 
faced in each jurisdiction.  For one sparsely populated district in the state’s mountain west 
region, one of the chief problems identified was that there was only “one Mary, one Laurie.” 
Id. 
2290 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
Fortunately, as the next Part explains, family law contains within it one of 
the best possible ways of testing whether a triage system is actually working. 
4.  Happily Divorced?:  Metrics for Judging Performance 
Any overview of innovation in family court needs to grapple with the 
question of evaluation:  how do we know whether these programs are 
working?  This, in turn, breaks down into (at least) two related questions:  
(1) how do we define success and (2) how do we measure for it?  Although 
these questions require more attention than can be given here, this Article 
briefly discusses two very different ways we might judge performance and 
then hones in on one particularly important metric. 
The first approach for judging performance focuses on the subjective 
perceptions of individual participants:  whether they feel they were treated 
fairly, had a chance to be heard, and received the information they needed to 
make progress in the resolution of their case.  As summarized by the National 
Center for State Courts, an institutional leader in the field of domestic-
relations triage, “This measure evaluates the extent to which the court is seen 
by its customers to demonstrate fairness, respect, equal treatment, and 
concern.”64 
The second approach focuses on quantitative, system-wide measures of 
effective case processing, which might include a court’s clearance rate 
(defined as the number of incoming cases as a percentage of outgoing cases), 
the age of pending cases, or the average time from filing to disposition.65  
These metrics help us understand whether courts are managing their dockets 
effectively and sustainably. 
Both subjective and systemic evaluations of family court programs are 
essential components of any comprehensive evaluation effort, and reformers 
and administrators are pursuing them assiduously.66  There is, however, one 
exceptionally important metric that bridges these two types of information 
and offers insight as to both litigant satisfaction and systemic improvement.  
This metric is the number and timing of postdecree motions filed in a 
particular case or in a particular jurisdiction.  Understanding why this metric 
is so important is very simple:  when families are not happily divorced, they 
will say so.  They will be back in court, presenting either old issues that were 
not really resolved by the previous disposition or new issues that have 
emerged from a postdivorce arrangement that is not working.67 
 
 64. Giving Courts the Tools to Measure Success, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (2017), 
http://www.courtools.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CourTools/CourToolsOnline-Final.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/MVB2-VMVW]. 
 65. See Roger Hanson et al., The Pursuit of High Performance, INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN., 
Nov. 2010, at 1, 6. 
 66. See, e.g., BRIAN OSTROM & ROGER HANSON, ACHIEVING HIGH PERFORMANCE:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR COURTS 41 (2010), https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ 
ctadmin/id/1874 [https://perma.cc/HD6K-M7RQ] (describing the need to measure both 
customer satisfaction and institutional efficiency and productivity).  
 67. The doctrinal foundation for this is a bit more complicated.  Essentially, custody orders 
are not considered final judgments because of the importance of allowing courts to exercise 
continuing jurisdiction over matters such as child custody and support. See Rebecca Aviel, A 
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That is why, when the programs described above are being reviewed for 
efficacy, the evaluations do not just examine the time it takes to bring a case 
to decree—although that is an important metric, it would not capture whether 
families are being herded into arrangements that do not really meet their 
needs.  The evaluations also track the number of postdecree motions that are 
filed in the first two years after the decree, as this is a revealing test of whether 
a family’s custodial and financial issues were comprehensively and 
meaningfully resolved in ways that will endure beyond the decree. 
The early returns for this most important indicator of success are very 
good, and I offer here one example.  When a jurisdiction in Alaska 
implemented and then evaluated an early resolution program, a study 
compared 299 cases that were resolved using the new program to a control 
group of randomly selected divorce and custody cases that were resolved 
during a two-year period before the program was implemented.68  
Importantly, because the control group was comprised of randomly selected 
cases that were resolved before the new program was available, the study was 
not distorted by the selection effect of having the most potentially 
cooperative families pulled out of the sample.69  Reviewing the results, it is 
notable that the cases from the early resolution program were resolved three 
to four times faster than the control-group cases.70  But what is truly 
significant was that there was no material difference in the number of 
modification motions filed within the first two years after the decree.71  Thus, 
the speed with which the early resolution program allowed participants to 
resolve their cases came at no cost to the long-term viability of the 
arrangements to which they agreed. 
The upshot of the foregoing is that the resolution of family disputes used 
to resemble other forms of civil litigation but is now undergoing a quiet 
transformation—a series of small changes that together are significant.  In 
the Part section, this Article considers whether these reforms promote access-
to-justice values. 
B.  An Access-to-Justice Movement? 
There is no single universally accepted definition of “access to justice,” 
and there is robust debate about what it means, both in the scholarly literature 
and among the reformers and advocates who work on access-to-justice 
initiatives.72  At its core, the concern has always been the inability of low- 
 
New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2028–29 (2014) (explaining 
that the court must be able to revisit custody disputes as necessary to protect the interests of 
the children involved). 
 68. Martin & Davis, supra note 61. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. One commenter objects to the very term, asserting that it is “amorphous” and 
distracting to talk about “justice” when what someone really wants, for example, is a will. Dan 
Lear, Lawyers Need to Move to Beyond ‘Access to Justice’ to Close the Legal Services Gap, 
A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/lawyers 
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and middle-income Americans to afford counsel for civil legal problems and 
the resulting “pro se crisis” that is overwhelming civil courts.73  The concept 
has expanded beyond legal representation to encompass a much broader 
range of strategies to meet the needs of people who cannot afford counsel,74 
an innovation born in part of necessity.  As one scholar has observed, a 
relentless series of defeats for the idea of a civil right to counsel has 
necessitated other solutions.75  She goes on to articulate a vision for “demand 
side reform,” describing “an overhaul of the processes and rules that govern 
litigation so that they best serve the interests of the overwhelming majority 
of customers in the lower state courts—the unrepresented.”76  In a similar 
vein, others have argued that simplification of court processes is an essential 
component of any meaningful access-to-justice movement.77 
As the foregoing descriptions suggest, the innovations in family court are 
consistent with these concepts of access to justice:  if there are not enough 
lawyers to work the system, then we will change the system so that it relies 
less on lawyers.  But there is something essential missing from that 
characterization.  The new family court was not developed in begrudging 
acceptance of the reality that a civil right to counsel was never going to 
materialize; it was envisioned as the best way to handle family disputes.  In 
fact, one of the great ironies of family dispute-resolution reform is that the 
turn toward problem-solving mechanisms and away from adversarial 
litigation has been most successful for families with means.78  This dynamic 
 
_need_to_move_beyond_access_to_justice_to_close_the_legal_services_g [https://perma.cc/ 
5RB9-7R9Z]. 
 73. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice:  A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1227, 1228 (2014) (noting that “[o]ver four-fifths of the poor’s legal needs and two- to three-
fifths of the legal needs of middle-income Americans remain unmet”).  See generally Aviel, 
supra note 47 (compiling sources that address the inability of many civil litigants to afford 
counsel for serious legal problems).  A broader concept includes the sort of phenomena 
described by Professor Arthur Miller, marking a “retreat from the principles of citizen access, 
private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in favor of corporate 
interests and concentrated wealth.” Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal:  A 
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010). 
 74. These include unbundled delivery of legal services, self-help centers, the development 
of forms that guide litigants to provide those facts that will be legally relevant to the resolution 
of their dispute, and the deployment of inquisitorial judicial practices. See generally Jessica 
K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate:  An Empirical Look at a Problem-Solving 
Housing Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058 (2017).   
 75. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. 
L. REV. 741, 746 (2015).  
 76. Id. (“Effective demand side reform would revise the procedural and evidentiary rules 
that commonly cause pro se litigants to stumble and require judges to develop facts that 
support established claims and defenses, thus enabling meaningful participation in the court 
system by those who appear without counsel.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Zorza, supra note 47, at 847–50.  In fact, the Center on Court Access to 
Justice for All has an entire section of its website devoted to the concept that simplification is 
an access-to-justice principle. Ctr. on Court Access to Justice for All, Rule and Process 
Simplification, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/microsites/access-to-
justice/home/Topics/Rule-and-Process-Simplification.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z9DF-AME2].  
But see MacDowell, supra note 31, at 498 (critiquing “informalism” and “delegalization” in 
family court).  
 78. As two commentators note:   
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offers a twist on Benjamin Barton’s exhortation to imagine a legal system 
that so effectively serves the interests of poor people that it becomes the envy 
of the rich.79 
The Center for Out-of-Court Divorce (COCD) in Denver, Colorado, 
illuminates some of these themes.  It started at the University of Denver, 
subsidized and operated in the model of clinical education, and then after two 
years transitioned to a free-standing center with the intent to become 
financially self-sustaining.80  Families paid a flat rate for a suite of services 
that included counseling, access to support groups, financial planning, legal 
education, mediation of parenting plans and financial issues, and the drafting 
of documents necessary to formalize the resulting agreements.81  Couples 
could choose to have the final hearing, during which their agreements would 
be converted to a decree, at the COCD instead of in court.82  Most COCD 
 
If disputing families have money, they can choose when and how much the court 
will be involved in their break up and reorganization.  Family lawyers now offer 
clients a range of options for resolving disputes relating to separation and divorce.  
Given these options, well-resourced parties increasingly choose out-of-court 
processes such as mediation, negotiation, and collaborative practice to resolve their 
conflicts without resorting to court involvement—thus reducing the acrimony and 
avoiding the loss of control and privacy that result from extended court proceedings.  
Murphy & Singer, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
 79. “[I]magine a world where there are special courts that are set up for the poor that 
operate so well that they are the envy of the wealthy, who are still using a lawyer-driven model 
that persists from 17th Century England.” Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for 
Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1273–74 (2010). 
 80. Unfortunately, this business model has presented some unforeseen challenges, and the 
COCD has had to suspend operations while “changes and refinements are researched that 
could ensure fiscal stability for a next version of the out-of-court model.” Emily Hastings, 
CODC Ceasing Operations as of November 20, 2017, CTR. FOR OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE (Nov. 
13, 2017), http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/blog/cocd-ceasing-operations-november-20-
2017/ [https://perma.cc/JE5K-TE8J].  While this highlights the importance of financial 
viability in developing alternative service models for divorcing families, it does not detract 
from the observations offered here about the extent to which families intentionally sought out, 
and benefitted from, nonadversarial alternatives, for reasons that go well beyond the 
extraordinary expense of traditional representation.   
 81. Separation and Divorce Services, CTR. FOR OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE, 
http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/services/ [https://perma.cc/V9CA-LRMK] (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2018).  The legal education component is described as helping couples to 
[i]dentify marital vs. separate assets and debt; [a]llocate marital assets and debt 
equitably between the parties; [d]etermine gross monthly incomes; [i]dentify which 
child-related expenses should be considered when calculating child support; 
[r]eview the Colorado child support guidelines to determine the recommended child 
support number; [r]eview the Colorado advisory maintenance guidelines concerning 
a monthly maintenance amount (formerly known as alimony) and duration; [and 
d]eliver a plan for moving forward as two separate households.  
Emily Hastings, Navigating the Legal Transaction of Divorce, CTR. FOR OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE 
(Sept. 23, 2016), http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/blog/video-navigating-legal-
transaction-divorce/ [https://perma.cc/XNK7-HZC2]. 
 82. Emily Hastings, Understanding the Out-of-Court Divorce Model:  Part Two, CTR. FOR 
OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE (Jan. 31, 2017), http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/blog/ 
understanding-court-model-part-two/ [https://perma.cc/5DXX-RSUC]; see Andrew Schepard 
& Rebecca Kourlis, Redefining Access to Justice for Separating and Divorcing Families, DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 22, 25 (observing that “[t]his is, to our knowledge, the first time 
in American history that a required judicial hearing approving a couple’s final divorce has 
been held outside a courthouse”).  
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families were able to complete the dissolution process within ninety to 120 
days.83  The fee for a “comprehensive transition package” was $6500, an 
amount that is simultaneously minute in comparison to traditional legal fees 
and yet utterly out of reach for a great many families.84 
Of the parents who participated in the first two years of the program, 40.6 
percent had an undergraduate degree and an additional 26.9 percent had also 
obtained a graduate degree, combining for an astonishing majority with 
significant educational attainment.85  As for income, 41 percent of the parents 
participating had individual annual incomes above $56,000.86  Twenty-three 
percent of all participating parents, in fact, reported individual annual 
incomes above $76,000.87  These figures bedevil customary assumptions 
about access to justice because they suggest that family law litigants who can 
afford to fund their preferences want out of the courthouse.88  Scholars who 
study the lawyer-client relationship have long understood that lawyers shape 
the behavior of clients rather than just reflecting preexisting client 
preferences.89  The remarkable insight that emerges from the family court 
context is that prospective clients understand that dynamic, and many of them 
want to avoid the siren song.  One of the COCD clients, reflecting on her 
experience, explained why she thought that not having a lawyer was actually 
a benefit in arriving at a satisfactory resolution of her divorce:  “During the 
division of the assets, when I came out thinking I was paying more—and I 
was, but that’s what was fair and equitable—it was important that I didn’t 
have somebody in my corner egging me on to fight,” she said.  “I could see 
where this could get ugly if we were in court and represented by people 
batting for us, rather than having two people who were advocates for both of 
us and for the family,” she continued.90 
Family court reform promotes access to justice, but it is a new kind of 
access to justice.  It overlaps substantially with the goals of delivering 
meaningful “demand-side reform” to low- and middle-income litigants to 
ameliorate the unfairness of being priced out of the market for legal services, 
 
 83. G.M. Filisko, Model Program Brings Holistic Solutions to Divorce, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 
2015), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/model_program_brings_holistic_ 
solutions_to_divorce [https://perma.cc/Q23Q-XYPL]. 
 84. Separation or Divorce Support Services, CTR. FOR OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE, 
http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/services/comprehensive-transition-support/ 
[https://perma.cc/T3HW-8YP2] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (listing the various services 
provided for the comprehensive $6500 family fee). 
 85. See CORNETT ET AL., supra note 14, at 16. 
 86. Id. at 16–17.  
 87. Id.  
 88. See id.  One testimonial reported that the out-of-court divorce process was a good fit 
because, “[a]s people who are relatively law abiding, the thought of going into the courthouse 
and sitting in front of the judge just feels terrifying.” J.P., Testimonials and Reviews, CTR. FOR 
OUT-OF-CT. DIVORCE, http://centerforoutofcourtdivorce.org/about-us/testimonials/ 
[https://perma.cc/2MSJ-HTDB] (last visited Mar. 15, 2018). 
 89. Katherine R. Kruse, Engaged Client-Centered Representation of the Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 577, 587 (2011) (noting 
that “clients do not arrive with static and pre-determined objectives to which lawyers can 
simply defer”).  
 90. See Filisko, supra note 83. 
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but it also advances goals that are not born out of economic necessity, that 
are driven by a much more extensive and complex set of ambitions.  The 
difficulty is not so much in accepting that these reforms promote access-to-
justice values but in assessing whether they offer any insight into other areas 
of law.  It is that to which we briefly turn next. 
II.  CAN FAMILY COURT REFORM OFFER 
INSIGHT FOR OTHER CONTEXTS? 
We must start with the recognition that family law is exceptional in some 
truly significant ways, including the field’s central and most pressing charge 
to protect the interests of children.  One of the reasons divorcing spouses 
might deem it in their interest to work collaboratively to unwind their 
marriage is that their definition of self-interest includes the well-being of 
their children.  The well-being of children, in turn, rests on their parents’ 
ability to minimize conflict during the divorce proceeding and to coparent 
effectively afterwards.91  Other areas of law might also involve litigants who 
will need to be able to work together or coexist relatively peacefully after the 
conclusion of their dispute, including disputes pertaining to employment, 
landlord-tenant relations, and small business partnerships.  None of these 
other areas, however, present the same concerns about vulnerable, dependent, 
unrepresented third parties being caught at the center of the dispute, and it is 
difficult to find any persuasive analogue for postdivorce coparenting:  a 
dissolution proceeding involving children restructures but does not truly end 
the parents’ relationship to one another. 
Nor is concern for children’s interests the only material difference that 
emerges when comparing family law to other regimes.  One of the 
foundational principles in the law of marital property is the rule that labor 
performed during marriage is marital labor, and the fruit of marital labor 
belongs to the marital estate rather than to the individual laboring spouse.92  
Moreover, except for gifts and inheritances, all property acquired during 
marriage is marital.93  This means that when divorcing couples drive up the 
transaction costs of their dissolution, they are depleting the very pot of assets 
for which they are seeking to obtain a favorable distribution.94  The unique 
interdependent and fiduciary relationship between divorcing spouses is 
 
 91. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family:  
Implications of a Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009) (“[S]ocial science 
suggests that children’s adjustment to divorce and separation depends significantly on their 
parents’ behavior during and after the separation process:  the higher the levels of parental 
conflict to which children are exposed, the more negative the effects of family dissolution.”). 
 92. Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 752 A.2d 291, 302–06 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) 
(holding that the increase in the value of stock acquired by a spouse prior to the marriage was 
marital property because the increase was the result of the spouse’s efforts during the 
marriage); see Brett R. Turner, Active Appreciation:  Second-Tier Managers, 22 EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION J. 1, 1 (2005) (“Equitable distribution theory provides that all value created 
during the marriage by the active efforts of one or both spouses constitutes marital property.”).  
 93. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
supra note 27, § 4.03. 
 94. I have detailed this phenomenon in earlier work. See Aviel, supra note 3, at 1110–11.   
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reflected and reinforced by a growing trend of mandatory mutual financial 
disclosures that diverge significantly from other forms of civil discovery.95  
With regard to both their children and their assets, then, divorcing spouses 
have incentives to cooperate that other litigants might not have. 
However, some of what is exceptional about family law cuts in the other 
direction, meaning that it does not necessarily promote collaborative 
problem-solving approaches.  As anyone who has ever lived in a family or 
known one can attest, the emotional valence that attends family disputes 
sometimes lends itself all too well to an adversarial posture and the kind of 
conflict that is not constrained by rational self-interest.  We want to be careful 
not to romanticize family court as some sort of mystical terrain of alternative 
dispute resolution where people are uniquely inclined to work collaboratively 
and forgo opportunities for aggressive adversarial process.  While this Article 
does not go so far as to treat “amicable divorce” as one of the “great 
oxymorons” of family law,96 it notes the wry observation here because it is a 
useful reminder that divorcing spouses who choose to work collaboratively 
to unwind their marriage may be overcoming a great deal of anger, 
resentment, betrayal, and antagonism to leverage their shared interest in 
avoiding litigation. 
Perhaps most importantly, in assessing whether the reforms reshaping 
family court might yield insights for other contexts, we need to emphasize 
that speed and cost are among the interests that family litigants repeatedly 
and overwhelmingly invoke as among their highest priorities.97  Domestic-
relations litigants are willing to knowingly and voluntarily forgo the 
opportunity to deploy doctrinal principles that might increase their take in 
return for a faster, smoother, more certain resolution.  To provide one 
example, the statutes that govern the distribution of marital property typically 
instruct that among the factors courts should take into account in arriving at 
an equitable allocation is the contribution of each party to the marital estate.98  
One can readily see how spouses might litigate the issue of contribution to 
increase their share, introducing evidence to substantiate the claim that their 
contribution was more than 50 percent and that it would thus be equitable to 
award them more than half of the marital property.  Every divorcing spouse 
who agrees to an equal distribution of marital property under such a scheme 
is waiving the opportunity to persuade the court that their particular 
circumstances warrant more than half of the assets.  As noted throughout, 
 
 95. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.2(e) (“Parties to domestic relations cases owe each other 
and the court a duty of full and honest disclosure of all facts that materially affect their rights 
and interests and those of the children involved in the case.  The court requires that, in the 
discharge of this duty, a party must affirmatively disclose all information that is material to 
the resolution of the case without awaiting inquiry from the other party.  This disclosure shall 
be conducted in accord with the duty of candor owing among those whose domestic issues are 
to be resolved under this Rule 16.2.”).  
 96. See Patrick L. Baude, One Lawyer for the Family:  A Response to Alysa Rollock, 73 
IND. L.J. 601, 603 (1998). 
 97. See, e.g., Munro et al., supra note 21, at 440–41. 
 98. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1973) 
(alternative B). 
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there are very good reasons for divorcing spouses to do that.  The point is 
that family litigants, for all their other specialized qualities, face a tension 
between efficiency and individualized justice that is commonly present in 
other contexts as well. 
With this very summary comparison as a backdrop, what might we then 
emphasize in thinking about how family court reform could transfer to other 
contexts?  This Article offers a few preliminary thoughts.  First, the 
transformation taking place in family court is not in any way a replacement 
regime.99  Not only does the system still offer a traditional, adversarial 
resolution of financial and custodial issues, but either party can demand it.  
To put the point in reverse, only when both parties agree to simplified 
dissolution or early resolution do these programs initialize.  While this means 
that there will inevitably be some loss of efficiency, when a party irrationally 
vetoes one of these alternatives under circumstances in which it would be 
optimal, that element of mutual consent seems like an important attribute of 
reform that is access enhancing rather than access inhibiting. 
Second, and closely related, the procedural reforms of the post-no-fault era 
have not changed the substantive entitlements.  As noted above, the law 
casting a shadow over a couple’s divorce negotiation still identifies 
contribution as an element in marital property distribution.  The entitlement 
that confers—however unpredictable and indeterminate—is still available to 
spouses who choose to pursue it.  Divorcing spouses waive out of these 
principles on the basis of a calculation of self-interest, as bounded and 
defined by the family relationships that are being restructured.  Those who 
choose not to waive the right to invoke such principles are under no 
compulsion to do so.100 
That brings us to the last and most important insight:  “fit the forum to the 
fuss,” that hoary adage of alternative dispute resolution, is an internal 
command.101  In trying to “expedite, streamline, and rationalize,”102 it is not 
sufficient, and can in fact be terribly inapt, to think about categories of like 
cases—whether it be divorce, landlord-tenant, or otherwise—and then to 
design a set of procedures that applies inflexibly to all the cases within.103  
The cases on either side of the domestic-relations spectrum, although they 
will each result in judgments of dissolution resolving the couple’s financial 
affairs, hardly resemble each other.  On one end are couples with brief 
marriages, few assets, and no kids, who literally do not have to show up, 
 
 99. Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts:  Lessons from the 
VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1640 (2015) (defining a “replacement regime” as one that 
displaces and makes unavailable prior systems).  
 100. Although they will, of course, still face the difficulty of affording the high costs of 
legal representation to meaningfully litigate these issues, which this Article acknowledges is 
itself a coercive dynamic.  
 101. See generally Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the 
Fuss:  A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994). 
 102. Engstrom, supra note 99, at 1636.  
 103. See Jason Parkin, Due Process Disaggregation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 
(2014) (describing “identifiable clusters of individuals in a particular context whose 
procedural needs are different from those of the majority”).  
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bringing new meaning to the term “mailing it in.”  On the other end of the 
spectrum, we might have any number of different circumstances.  If one 
parent is accusing the other of intimate partner violence, there may be civil 
protection orders pending and a collateral criminal proceeding awaiting 
resolution.  Child welfare agencies may be involved if there are concerns that 
the children are at risk for abuse or neglect.  Perhaps the couple owns a 
business together that will require a professional valuation prior to partition.  
There may be immigration issues triggering consequences under federal 
law.104  The possibilities for conflict and complexity abound, as they can in 
any context that involves human relationships. 
What the new family court can teach the rest of the world is that 
simplification is an essential component of access-enhancing reforms but that 
not all cases are amenable to it, and that systems must be designed around 
that recognition.  We must judge the system on how well it differentiates, 
rather than treating the complex and challenging cases as some sort of 
unexpected anomaly that prevents the system from achieving its goals.105 
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